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Big picture
I How well can investors price financial assets, when pricing
theory not fully developed?
I Equity options: quite well, e.g. Murphy (2009) 17th century
London, Moore and Juh (2006) South Africa in early 20th
century.
I Commodity futures: hard to tell, since data on storage costs
and convenience yield are needed (e.g. Wakita (2001) and
Bell, Brooks and Dryburgh (2007)).
I Equity futures: not yet been studied in a historical setting,
theoretically much easier to price since no storage or
convenience.
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Big picture, cont’d
I Historically important since (commodity) forwards have been
used in commerce for 4000 years. Financial futures have
existed for 400 years in Western Europe, since development of
joint-stock corporations.
I Although the intuition of how to price futures and forwards
was well understood in the early 20th century, the pricing
relation was not perfectly understood.
I Academic debate in the 1930s regarding whether preferences
were important for pricing futures.
I Debate settled by 1940s.
I Black (1976) showed how to calculate futures options in a
constant interest rate situation, and Hilliard and Reis (1998)
demonstrate how to price futures under stochastic interest
rates.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Big picture, cont’d
I Historically important since (commodity) forwards have been
used in commerce for 4000 years. Financial futures have
existed for 400 years in Western Europe, since development of
joint-stock corporations.
I Although the intuition of how to price futures and forwards
was well understood in the early 20th century, the pricing
relation was not perfectly understood.
I Academic debate in the 1930s regarding whether preferences
were important for pricing futures.
I Debate settled by 1940s.
I Black (1976) showed how to calculate futures options in a
constant interest rate situation, and Hilliard and Reis (1998)
demonstrate how to price futures under stochastic interest
rates.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Big picture, cont’d
I Historically important since (commodity) forwards have been
used in commerce for 4000 years. Financial futures have
existed for 400 years in Western Europe, since development of
joint-stock corporations.
I Although the intuition of how to price futures and forwards
was well understood in the early 20th century, the pricing
relation was not perfectly understood.
I Academic debate in the 1930s regarding whether preferences
were important for pricing futures.
I Debate settled by 1940s.
I Black (1976) showed how to calculate futures options in a
constant interest rate situation, and Hilliard and Reis (1998)
demonstrate how to price futures under stochastic interest
rates.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Big picture, cont’d
I Historically important since (commodity) forwards have been
used in commerce for 4000 years. Financial futures have
existed for 400 years in Western Europe, since development of
joint-stock corporations.
I Although the intuition of how to price futures and forwards
was well understood in the early 20th century, the pricing
relation was not perfectly understood.
I Academic debate in the 1930s regarding whether preferences
were important for pricing futures.
I Debate settled by 1940s.
I Black (1976) showed how to calculate futures options in a
constant interest rate situation, and Hilliard and Reis (1998)
demonstrate how to price futures under stochastic interest
rates.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Big picture, cont’d
I Historically important since (commodity) forwards have been
used in commerce for 4000 years. Financial futures have
existed for 400 years in Western Europe, since development of
joint-stock corporations.
I Although the intuition of how to price futures and forwards
was well understood in the early 20th century, the pricing
relation was not perfectly understood.
I Academic debate in the 1930s regarding whether preferences
were important for pricing futures.
I Debate settled by 1940s.
I Black (1976) showed how to calculate futures options in a
constant interest rate situation, and Hilliard and Reis (1998)
demonstrate how to price futures under stochastic interest
rates.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Why study Japan?
I Japan was the first place in the world to develop commodity
futures (i.e. with a centralized clearing house, standardized
contracts, marking to market) around 1730 for the delivery of
rice.
I Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) founded in 1878 and futures
were present from the start, presumably due to familiarity
with the concept from rice trading.
I By the early 20th century the TSE was the largest market in
Japan (Osaka was the only serious rival) and futures trading
was far more important than the small spot market. The
futures market may have helped facilitate liquid trading of
securities.
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Features of the TSE
I Around 600-800 stocks traded in the (illiquid) spot market.
I Around 200 of these traded in the futures market. Contracts
could be resold as many times as desired, at expiry the
difference between the spot price and the futures price was
usually paid/received in cash.
I No marking to market. Makes valuation easier, since these are
effectively forward contracts.
I There were three contracts in existence for each stock:
delivery at end of current month, delivery at end of next
month, delivery at end of subsequent month. E.g. on 15
January 1920 the contracts for delivery were: 31 January
1920, 28 February 1920 and 31 March 1920.
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Features of the TSE, cont’d
I From 1914 futures needed to be from:
I Firms at least 2 years old.
I With a total paid-in nominal value of at least 1 million Yen
(approx. $0.5m).
I If a firm already had shares traded on the futures market,
subsequent issues need to have a paid-in nominal value of at
least 500 000 Yen.
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Futures data
I We collect futures data from Japan Times and Mail (English)
a Tokyo daily newspaper. Suspicious prices are checked
against Yomiuri Shimbun (Japanese). TSE only began
publishing an official list post WW2.
I Both papers only report a small section of the market, 40-50
securities, presumably the larger and more liquid securities.
Other newspapers (e.g. Asahi Shimbun) do not report prices
for a larger selection of securities. We choose 29 of the most
frequently traded securities from the Japan Times and Mail.
I Only transaction prices are reported (no bid-ask quotes
available), if no trade occurred, no price is reported.
I We collect daily data from January 6, 1920 to August 28,
1923 (earthquake in September 1923 shuts the exchange for 2
months).
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Interest rate data
I We collect interest rate data from the Yomiuri Shimbun every
day. We collect the overnight rate and the over month rate.
I Interpolate between the two rates for maturities between 1
day and 1 month.
I Assume rates for longer maturity are equal to 1 month rate.
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Theoretical Pricing
I For futures pricing to preclude arbitrage (between contract
pairs) the following relation needs to hold between all possible
contract pairs (e.g. 1-month and 2-month, 2-month and
3-month and 1-month and 3-month):
FT = e
r(T−t)Ft
If prices do not follow this relationship, then arbitrage profits
exist.
Toby Daglish and Lyndon Moore Japanese Futures
Background
Data
Theory
Results
Theoretical pricing, cont’d
I Example: On 1 Jan 1921, we observe:
I Jan future = 50.
I Feb future = 51.
I r = 6%.
I We buy 1 January contract, cost = 50 Yen.
I Borrow 50 Yen from end Jan to end Feb: cost =
50e0.06/12 − 50 = 0.2506.
I Short 1 February contract: revenue = 51 Yen.
I Take delivery of the stock at end-Jan and deliver at end-Feb.
I To perfectly arbitrage this we would need to be able to enter
into forward rate agreement (i.e. contract today to borrow for
1 month at the end of January). The extent to which this is
difficult or costly will reduce arbitrage opportunities.
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Mispricing
I We calculate mispricing as the observed futures price (for the
longer term contract) less the predicted price for the longer
term contract (given the observed shorter term futures price)
and normalise by dividing by the observed longer maturity
futures price:
 =
FT − d(t)d(T )Ft − PVt−PVTd(T )
FT
We do this every day for every contract pair. We calculate
root mean squared errors (averaged over time) for each
firm-pair.
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Dividends and other oddities
I The TSE produced a yearbook, from which we are able to
obtain dividend information. Unfortunately, it is only monthly.
I We choose the dividend date which best prices the preceding
1 month and 2 month futures pair.1
I We remove pairs when there has clearly been a capital
operation.
I We also remove contracts maturing at end of April 1920.
Stock exchange was closed part way through month due to
panic following collapse of Chinese export market.
1Our results are robust to using the worst date, and the middle of the month.
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Kanegafuchi Cotton (40 yen) 0.0092 0.0072 0.0114 0.0086
Nisshin Cotton 0.0217 0.0197 0.0265 0.0179
Kanegafuchi Cotton (50 yen) 0.0116 0.0082 0.0139 0.0120
Tokyo Stock Exchange 0.0096 0.0078 0.0118 0.0090
Yokohama Stock Exchange 0.0318 0.0106 0.0522 0.0114
Dai Nippon Sugar 0.0165 0.0160 0.0201 0.0128
Fuji Gas (50 yen) 0.0349 0.0327 0.0420 0.0280
Tokyo Stock Exchange (new) 0.0078 0.0067 0.0099 0.0064
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 0.0114 0.0102 0.0124 0.0111
Jomo Muslin 0.0300 0.0136 0.0476 0.0130
Ensuiko Sugar 0.0220 0.0113 0.0342 0.0101
Toyo Muslin 0.0311 0.0260 0.0386 0.0261
Tokyo Woollen Cloth 0.0204 0.0248 0.0180 0.0186
Toyo Sugar 0.0602 0.0436 0.0816 0.0418
Nippon Kinematographe 0.0202 0.0180 0.0234 0.0183
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Toyo Cotton 0.0418 0.0395 0.0493 0.0336
Fuji Gas (25 yen) 0.0130 0.0136 0.0142 0.0109
Fuji Paper 0.0215 0.0242 0.0199 0.0209
Dai Nippon Fertilizer 0.0346 0.0184 0.0392 0.0395
Tokyo Muslin 0.0237 0.0123 0.0280 0.0256
Kinogawa/Kidagawa Power 0.0138 0.0116 0.0161 0.0122
Hokkaido Col. Str. 0.0142 0.0113 0.0157 0.0142
Toa Milling 0.0532 0.0256 0.0782 0.0322
Nippon Mlng./Japan Flr. Grd. 0.0240 0.0157 0.0320 0.0182
Teikoku Hemp/Imperial Linen 0.0294 0.0159 0.0417 0.0162
Nippon Hemp/Linen 0.0659 0.0158 0.0996 0.0187
Tainan Sugar 0.0535 0.0505 0.0614 0.0424
Toyo Kisen Kaisha 0.0272 0.0281 0.0305 0.0196
South Manchuria Rail 0.0308 0.0351 0.0345 0.0105
AVERAGE 0.0271 0.0198 0.0346 0.0193
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Problems with asynchronicity
I Since we deal with transaction data, we have no guarantee
they are observed at the same point in time. We may be
calculating mispricing with asynchronous data, which will tend
to increase the measured mispricing.
I We run a simulation exercise to estimate, given volatility and
trade frequency, the anticipated mispricing if the data were
asynchronous.
I If 2 futures contracts for the same firm were priced correctly
at a moment in time, but possibly observed at different times
during the same day  = ST−StST .
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Problems with asynchronicity, cont’d
I For each firm-contract pair we do the following:
I Generate series of trade times for the near- and long-maturity
contracts (N1,N2, . . . ) and (L1, L2, . . . ) given a poisson
intensity of trade arrival. May generate multiple trades per day.
I Generate a series of spot prices for each contract SN1,SN2, . . .
and SL1,SL2, . . . assuming that the stock price follows a
Geometric Brownian Motion.
I Construct last-price-of-the-day spot prices for both contracts,
Sn1,Sn2, . . . ,Sn1339 and Sl1,Sl2, . . . ,Sl1339.
I Calculate mispricing errors as j =
Slj−Snj
Slj
.
I Calculate RMSE for this pricing pair over the 1339 days of
generated data (the same period as covered by our actual
data).
I Repeat 1000 times and calculate an average.
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generated data (the same period as covered by our actual
data).
I Repeat 1000 times and calculate an average.
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Kanegafuchi Cotton (40 yen) -0.0184 -0.0215 -0.0165 -0.0177
Nisshin Cotton 0.0108* 0.0084* 0.0156* 0.0075*
Kanegafuchi Cotton (50 yen) 0.0036* -0.0002 0.0058* 0.0044*
Tokyo Stock Exchange -0.0001 -0.0023 0.0019* -0.0004
Yokohama Stock Exchange 0.0185* -0.0032 0.0391* -0.0016
Dai Nippon Sugar 0.0070* 0.0061* 0.0107* 0.0034*
Fuji Gas (50 yen) 0.0264* 0.0239* 0.0337* 0.0195*
Tokyo Stock Exchange (new) -0.0030 -0.0041 -0.0009 -0.0043
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 0.0052* 0.0039* 0.0065* 0.0049*
Jomo Muslin 0.0171* 0.0004 0.0348* 0.0002
Ensuiko Sugar 0.0107* -0.0003 0.0231* -0.0010
Toyo Muslin 0.0165* 0.0111* 0.0242* 0.0116*
Tokyo Woollen Cloth 0.0049* 0.0091* 0.0027* 0.0030*
Toyo Sugar 0.0483* 0.0315* 0.0701* 0.0300*
Nippon Kinematographe 0.0062* 0.0038* 0.0095* 0.0044*
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Toyo Cotton 0.0316* 0.0291* 0.0393* 0.0235*
Fuji Gas (25 yen) -0.0005 0.0000 0.0008* -0.0025
Fuji Paper 0.0106* 0.0132* 0.0093* 0.0100*
Dai Nippon Fertilizer 0.0124* -0.0040 0.0174* 0.0171*
Tokyo Muslin 0.0104* -0.0011 0.0148* 0.0123*
Kinogawa/Kidagawa Power 0.0043* 0.0019* 0.0066* 0.0026*
Hokkaido Col. Str. 0.0026* -0.0005 0.0044* 0.0025*
Toa Milling 0.0244* -0.0035 0.0496* 0.0033*
Nippon Mlng./Japan Flr. Grd. -0.0001 -0.0085 0.0081 -0.0059
Teikoku Hemp/Imperial Linen 0.0146* 0.0010* 0.0270* 0.0014*
Nippon Hemp/Linen 0.0470* -0.0032 0.0809* -0.0003
Tainan Sugar -0.0372 -0.0405 -0.0286 -0.0488
Toyo Kisen Kaisha 0.0129* 0.0137* 0.0162* 0.0052*
South Manchuria Rail 0.0212* 0.0254* 0.0249* 0.0008*
AVERAGE 0.0106* 0.0031* 0.0183* 0.0029*
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Which figures to believe?
I If we believed that:
I all observed prices were generated by arbitrageurs trading (all 3
maturities) simultaneously,
I or by investors who adjust their portfolios by trading all
maturities at the same time,
I or perhaps all trading in the day is concentrated at a point in
time (e.g. just before lunch, just before close of trading).
I then asynchronicity does not exist, and the unadjusted
numbers give the best picture of how well investors priced
futures.
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Which figures to believe? cont’d
I If we believe that trades for one firm’s futures, of a certain
maturity, are independent of the trades of that firm’s other
maturity futures, then asynchronicity does exist, and our
method should accurately tell us how much mispricing we
should expect to measure even if (at a point in time)
mispricing does not exist.
I In reality, the situation is probably between these two
extremes, and we have plausible bounds for the amount of
“true” mispricing in the Japanese futures market.
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How big is big?
I It would be nice to compare mispricing in early 20th century
Japan with contemporary Japan, which has access to a more
developed futures pricing model with deeper financial markets.
I However, single-stock futures do not exist in modern Japan
(only index futures).
I Therefore, we turn to US data and OneChicago market:
I OneChicago is not a very liquid market. We compare the 22
(out of 1300) futures which are more liquid than the least
liquid firm we study on the TSE.
I OneChicago uses marking to market, which needs to be
treated carefully in valuing futures. We use the method of
Hillard and Reis (1998) to measure pricing errors, using the
LIBOR yield curve.
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Apple 0.0130 0.0121 0.0125 0.0166
Research in Motion 0.0195 0.0187 0.0202 0.0216
Citigroup 0.0598 0.0549 0.0757 0.0544
Bank of America 0.0303 0.0341 0.0254 0.0224
Freeport McMoran 0.0317 0.0280 0.0417 0.0357
Goldman Sachs 0.0267 0.0253 0.0320 0.0245
JP Morgan 0.0200 0.0195 0.0202 0.0222
Google 0.0142 0.0139 0.0149 0.0145
Amazon 0.0173 0.0186 0.0151 0.0142
Qualicomm 0.0151 0.0146 0.0164 0.0153
Nucorp 0.0181 0.0156 0.0267 0.0131
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Walmart 0.0086 0.0090 0.0080 0.0063
Exxon Mobil 0.0128 0.0102 0.0195 0.0090
Gilead 0.0123 0.0126 0.0125 0.0101
Johnson and Johnson 0.0088 0.0081 0.0127 0.0051
Wells Fargo 0.0301 0.0245 0.0484 0.0347
Sears 0.0462 0.0357 0.0723 0.0443
Morgan Stanley 0.0492 0.0465 0.0393 0.0799
CME 0.0268 0.0230 0.0333 0.0291
US Steel 0.0265 0.0270 0.0280 0.0107
Microsoft 0.0144 0.0172 0.0073 0.0116
Intel 0.0177 0.0154 0.0269 0.0189
AVERAGE 0.0239 0.0223 0.0277 0.0236
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Apple -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0027 0.0018*
Research in Motion -0.0048 -0.0043 -0.0051 -0.0035
Citigroup 0.0119* 0.0094* 0.0256* 0.0045
Bank of America -0.0056 -0.0008 -0.0116 -0.0143
Freeport McMoran 0.0024* -0.0006 0.0120* 0.0061*
Goldman Sachs 0.0016 0.0006 0.0064* -0.0011
JP Morgan -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0084 -0.0063
Google -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0017
Amazon -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0065 -0.0073
Qualicomm -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0005
Nucorp -0.0077 -0.0098 0.0006 -0.0130
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Firm All 1-2 1-3 2-3
Walmart -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0040
Exxon Mobil 0.0000 -0.0025 0.0066* -0.0040
Gilead -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0042
Johnson and Johnson -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0036* -0.0040
Wells Fargo 0.0038* -0.0015 0.0219* 0.0081*
Sears 0.0171* 0.0069* 0.0430* 0.0151*
Morgan Stanley 0.0101* 0.0078* 0.0001 0.0406*
CME 0.0005 -0.0030 0.0068* 0.0025
US Steel -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0200
Microsoft -0.0001 0.0028* -0.0073 -0.0030
Intel 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0100* 0.0021
AVERAGE -0.0055 -0.0053 -0.0023 -0.0028
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Transaction costs
I We do not have reliable data on transaction costs for the
TSE, but we do for OneChicago.
I Bid-ask spreads are, on average, 0.22% of the futures price,
and brokerage charges add 0.01-0.04%.
I After removing these, along with asynchronicity, two of the 18
contract pairs become insignificant.
I A similar calculation for Japan renders 11 of the 59 contract
pairs insignificant.
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Regressions
I We now investigate which contracts tend to be priced more
accurately by investors, perhaps due to more active
arbitrageurs.
I We regress mispricing on the firm’s volatility, liquidity, and
size.
I We include dummies for contract pair type.
I We also include a dummy variable based on whether  was
negative. These would be contracts where the arbitrage would
require holding a short position in the stock.
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accurately by investors, perhaps due to more active
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Regresion results: Japan (unadjusted)
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0156 5.4779 0.0167 5.8722
Dneg 0.0029 1.8918 0.0008 0.7378
Dneg*D13 0.0053 2.5058
Dneg*D23 0.0005 0.9462
D13 0.0065 7.7737 0.0042 6.8994
D23 0.0015 4.3720 0.0012 2.6934
AVGT -0.0111 -3.6930 -0.0112 -3.7468
Sigma 0.0015 0.9002 0.0015 0.9101
Size -0.0023 -4.0494 -0.0024 -4.0663
R2 0.039 0.041
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Regression results: Japan (adjusted)
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant 0.0106 4.3538 0.0117 4.7253
Dneg 0.0029 1.9127 0.0008 0.7573
Dneg*D13 0.0052 2.4723
Dneg*D23 0.0006 1.0773
D13 0.0072 8.6757 0.0049 8.4023
D23 0.0013 3.8083 0.0010 2.3394
AVGT -0.0040 -1.4162 -0.0042 -1.4729
Sigma -0.0311 -28.3145 -0.0311 -28.3759
Size -0.0021 -3.7218 -0.0021 -3.7112
R2 0.1346 0.1365
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Regression results: OneChicago (unadjusted)
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant -0.0006 -0.1330 -0.0000 -0.0099
Dneg 0.0020 1.0963 0.0010 0.6489
Dneg*D13 0.0039 1.8289
Dneg*D23 0.0011 0.6417
D13 0.0021 1.5069 -0.0003 -0.2592
D23 -0.0012 -0.5944 -0.0019 -0.7007
AVGT -0.0063 -1.8010 -0.0064 -1.8053
Sigma 0.0260 6.1567 0.0260 6.1263
Size -0.0008 -0.4859 -0.0008 -0.4768
R2 0.1257 0.1268
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Regression results: OneChicago (adjusted)
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant -0.0025 -0.5317 -0.0019 -0.4053
Dneg 0.0020 1.0938 0.0010 0.6396
Dneg*D13 0.0040 1.8706
Dneg*D23 0.0012 0.6542
D13 0.0013 1.0548 -0.0011 -1.0091
D23 -0.0009 -0.4413 -0.0016 -0.6155
AVGT -0.0032 -0.8806 -0.0033 -0.8917
Sigma -0.0084 -1.8015 -0.0083 -1.7790
Size -0.0006 -0.3357 -0.0006 -0.3264
R2 0.0153 0.0167
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Conclusions
I Asynchronicity can disguise poor pricing performance.
I Some “arbitrage opportunities” in modern market.
I Slightly more in early 20th century Japan, but only for 1-3
pair. Other pairs can be explained by asynchronicity.
I Negative RMSEs hint that we may have correlated trading,
perhaps caused by arbitrageurs.
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